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Abstract
The literature on venture nancing mainly focuses on entrepreneurial moral
hazard. The investor, however, may behave opportunistically, too. We look at
the case where the investor demands a higher share on the venture's return be-
fore nancing the next stage. Possibly, the staging of capital is the most salient
feature of venture nancing. The entrepreneur may be forced to accept the in-
vestor's oer, when she is supposed to lose something by changing the investor.
For instance, if the property rights on the invention are not suciently protected
- because the entrepreneur has not led for a patent or the invention does not
meet the legal requirements for patent protection - the investor may use the idea
for his own purposes once the entrepreneur terminates the relationship. This
threat may force the entrepreneur to continue although the investor demands a
higher share. As a consequence, she sticks with the investor, however, she may
not choose the ecient level of specic investments, rather she underinvests.
The impact of patent law is important. In the law and economics literature
patent law is primarily seen as an instrument balancing the trade-o between
setting incentives to innovate and limiting monopoly power of patent holders.
It, however, overlooks the fact that an entrepreneur's idea often only develops
to a market product with the help of investors providing nancial resources.
Thus, I argue that there is an additional goal of patent law: mitigating conicts
in the venture nancing process thereby making innovations more likely.- 0 -
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Staging of Venture Financing, Moral Hazard, and Patent Law
1. Introduction
One salient feature of venture financing is the staging of capital infusions.
1 There are
two benefits of staging both due to the “option of waiting”. First, it is possible to stop
the venture without losing too much money when it turns out that external factors
become unfavorable, e.g. market demand does not increase as expected or
competitors emerge suddenly. The option to stop is valuable to both the investor and
the entrepreneur. Second, the staging of capital allows to mitigate opportunistic
behavior by the entrepreneur.
2 Since the entrepreneur usually hardly provides funds
by her own she may be interested in continuation although the termination of the
venture would be efficient, for instance when she receives a private benefit from
running the venture.
3 The option to wait is valuable to the investor.
The staging of capital, however, may also induce opportunistic behavior by the
investor. When entrepreneur and investor renegotiate the terms of the financial
contract before a new stage is financed the investor may expropriate rents knowing
the entrepreneur will lose when she would terminate the relationship and choose
another, new investor. There are several reasons why the entrepreneur may lose.
First, the entrepreneur may (partly) lose the benefits of specific investments, e.g. her
human capital she contributed, her effort for providing information and developing
prototypes to make the (old) investor agree on the continuation of the venture.
Second, transaction costs may occur when the entrepreneur looks for a new investor.
They may be both non-monetary (stress, uncertainty) and monetary, for instance,
costs of searching and costs to overcome informational asymmetries.
4 Third, the
entrepreneur may lose some private, non-monetary benefits when she switches to
another investor. Maybe a new investor would restrict entrepreneurial freedom,
especially when the new investor assumes that rather bad entrepreneurs switch than
good ones. Fourth, if the entrepreneur failed to file for patent protection or if patent
protection is not yet available since the invention does not entirely meet the legal
requirements of patent law or if intellectual property rights are not sufficiently
protected by trade secrets, for instance, due to problems of enforcement, the
                                                       
1 See Sahlman (1990), pp. 560f., Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 139-169.
2 See Gompers/Lerner (1999), pp. 140-145, Neher (1999), pp. 269f., Schmidt, K. (2000), p. 9.
3 See the empirical study of Arnold (1989), pp. 224-279 for different sources of non-monetary benefits
of German entrepreneurs (of small and medium sized enterprises).
4 See Bigus (2002).
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entrepreneur has to take into account that the investor may “steal” the idea and use it
for his own purposes or for other ventures.
The investor who is aware of these possible entrepreneurial losses may take
advantage and may demand a higher share on the venture’s future return before
financing the next stage. If it is more costly to acquire alternative funds, the
entrepreneur may have to accept the investor’s offer, though. In this article, we focus
on the fourth point, i.e. on hold-up due to weak patent protection. If the property
rights on the innovation are not sufficiently protected the old investor may use the
idea or parts of the innovation for his own purposes, maybe for other ventures he has
a stake at. This threat may force the entrepreneur to continue although the investor
demands a higher share. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may be forced to stick
with the investor, however, she may reduce her level of specific investments even it
would not be efficient do to so (underinvestment).
The impact of patent law is important. In the law and economics literature patent law
is primarily seen as an instrument balancing the trade-off between setting incentives
to innovate and limiting monopoly power of patent holders. It, however, overlooks
the fact that an entrepreneur’s idea often only develops to a market product with the
help of investors providing financial resources. Thus, I argue that there is an
additional goal of patent law: mitigating conflicts in the venture financing process
thereby making innovations more likely.
There is a large body on literature on incentive problems due to specific
investments.
5 With respect to venture financing, there are the contributions of Neher
(1999), Aghion/Tirole (1994), Hansmann/Kraakman (1992) and Schmidt (2000).
Neher (1999) refers to Hart/Moore (1994) and analyses the opportunistic behavior of
a wealth-constrained entrepreneur. Without the entrepreneur’s human capital the
venture receives no return. Since the investor provides all the funds the entrepreneur
may renegotiate the contract threatening to withdraw her human capital. Note that
this is a kind of entrepreneur’s moral hazard which is commonly analyzed in the
literature. Aghion/Tirole (1994) ask whether a research unit (here: the entrepreneur)
or the investor should own the property right on the invention, when both parties
make specific investments simultaneously and the property right is not divisible.
They conclude that the party who invests more should own the property right.
However, they do not consider the special incentive problems which may occur due
to stage financing. The same is true for Hansmann/Kraakman (1992) and Schmidt
(2000), who analyze the question how to allocate cash flow rights when the parties
                                                       
5 See, for instance, Williamson (1983), Grossman/Hart (1986), Hart (1995).
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invest in a sequence, but not simultaneously: first the entrepreneur invests, then the
investor.
There are also plenty contributions to the question to which extent patent law should
protect the property rights on inventions.
6 However, there is only a piecemeal
literature addressing the question how venture financing may be affected when the
entrepreneur faces potential losses with regard to (other) transaction costs of
switching except for those arising from specific investments.
 Aghion/Bolton (1992)
and Laux (1996) investigate the role of entrepreneurial non-monetary benefits more
generally, however, not in the context of stage financing of ventures. Bigus (2002)
shows that the entrepreneur may be locked-in if an inside investor has superior
information on the entrepreneur’s or the venture’s quality. Thus, an inside investor
may expropriate some rents due to his information monopoly.
7
In what follows, we first present a model in section 2 showing how the old investor
may act opportunistically and renegotiate the contract if property rights on the
innovation are not sufficiently protected by contractual or legal provisions. Section 3
shows how the model relates to the law and economics literature on patent law and
provides a closer look to the requirements for patent protection under current
German and European patent codes and Section 4 concludes.
2. A model on investor’s moral hazard due to weak protection of innovation’s
property rights
2.1 Description of the model
We want to know under which circumstances the investor may have an incentive to
expropriate the entrepreneur when they negotiate on the financial terms of the next
stage. If property rights on the innovation are not sufficiently protected, for instance
because the idea does not yet entirely meet the legal requirements for patent
protection, the investor may demand better financial terms in the second stage. In
case the entrepreneur does not accept the investor may threaten to use the idea for his
own purposes, for instance for another venture. Thus, the entrepreneur may be forced
to accept the less favorable terms. But she may reduce her level of specific
investments in the next stage although a higher level would be efficient
(underinvestment). The important point is that the entrepreneur is somewhat “locked-
                                                       
6 See, for instance, Besen/Raskind (1991), Dam (1994), Kitch (1998).
7 See for a similar hold-up problem in the context of bank financing Fischer (1990) and Rajan (1992).
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in”, since property rights on the innovation are not sufficiently protected and she can
lose something in case of termination or switching to new investor.
In order to analyze the problem we assume the following:
(M1) (Set of investment opportunities) Entrepreneur A is wealth-constrained and has
the opportunity to undertake a venture in t=0. There are two stages. In t=0 and t=1,
the same fixed investment I (I > 0) is required. Returns occur in t=2 and t=3,
respectively. For simplicity, in t=2 and t=3, there are only two possible outcomes:
success and failure. In case of success, return amounts to X (X > I > 0), in case of
failure there is zero return.
The success probability p in both stages especially depends on the entrepreneur’s
specific investments (e):
8
(1) p = p(e)  with e = {eL, eH} with eL = 0 and eH > 0 and
0 < p(e = eL) = pL < p(e = eH) = pH = pL + p < 1.
Even with a low level of specific investments it is favorable to undertake the venture,
i.e. it holds:
(2.1) pLX > I.
Success probability increases if the entrepreneur chooses a high level of specific
investments (eH). A specific investment can be the effort the entrepreneur puts into
the venture. Thus, in what follows, we also use the term “effort”. Specific investment
by the entrepreneur are supposed to be efficient, i.e.:
9
(2.2) eH < pX.
The parties cannot contract upon specific investments. This assumption seems to be
plausible, if it is not possible (or prohibitively costly) to precisely describe the
entrepreneurial effort ex ante, especially, when effort is comprised of several
dimensions and actions, e.g. management and technical issues. Furthermore, effort is
not contractible if a court cannot verify the effort level.
(M2) (Set of financing opportunities) The entrepreneur has no funds, however,
investors have sufficient funds to provide I in t=0 and/or t=1. For simplicity, we
consider only equity financing:
10 an investor receives a share s (0 < s £ 1) on the
future returns of the relevant investment, the entrepreneur the share 1-s. Since there
are two investments, two financial transactions are required. There is strong
competition among venture capitalists such that the cooperative surplus entirely goes
                                                       
8 For sake of simplicity, we assume pL > 0 even with eL = 0. The probability of success may also
depend on other factors than entrepreneurial effort, such as external factors or the entrepreneur’s
quality (skills) which we do not explicitly consider here. We obtain very similar results assuming  0 <
eL < eH, however, the presentation becomes more complex.
9 Thus, we assume that non-monetary utilities can be measured in monetary units which is common in
microeconomics theory. See for the restrictive requirements to do so Keeney/Raiffa (1976).
10 The qualitative results do not change assuming debt financing or a mix of debt and equity financing
(hybrid financing).
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to the entrepreneur. In t=3, the venture is liquidated (e.g., by an initial public
offering).
(M3) (Lack of patent protection) Property rights on the innovation are not entirely
protected, for instance, because the idea is not sufficiently developed in order to meet
the requirements for patent filing or because contractual agreements such as trade
secrets may not be (entirely) enforceable, may be due to high enforcement costs or
due to verification problems. The investor may partly use the invention for his own
purposes if the relationship with the entrepreneur is terminated in t=1. In case of
termination, the investor receives a portion w of the innovation’s second stage value,
i.e. w￿(pX-I), with 0 < w < 1. The entrepreneur may continue with a new investor N,
however, cooperative surplus is then reduced to (1-w)(pX-I).
11 If she sticks with the
old investor O, O cannot appropriate rents in the second period since she can observe
and control for that. After the second period, no investor cannot appropriate rents
from the idea anymore, for instance, because then the idea is sufficiently developed
in order to meet the requirements of patent law.
(M4) (Information structure) The investor cannot control the level of specific
investments. He may observe the effort level in the first period, but external players,
e.g. a court, cannot. Since return in t=2 is either X or 0, it is not possible to derive the
chosen effort level from the payoff level. Apart from that, information is distributed
symmetrically. There are homogeneous expectations with regard to the
entrepreneur's project set and the projects' returns.
(M5) (Participation constraints) Both, entrepreneur and investor only agree on a
contract when they at least receive zero expected utility or zero profit, respectively.
The rate of return for risk-free investments is 0%. All players are risk-neutral.
12 Each
player is interested in maximizing (expected) individual wealth in t=3.
The entrepreneur exerts high effort, only if her share on future cash flows is
sufficiently large, i.e. if the investor’s share s is small enough:






In order to yield a zero profit at least, the minimum share an investor demands equals
to:
(3.2) I = s(pL + p)X or s = 




                                                       
11 We assume that the a new investor takes into account opportunistic behavior by the (old) investor
and assesses w in the same way as the entrepreneur. If there are heterogeneous estimations with
respect to w, the analysis becomes more complicate without changing the qualitative results.
12 Investors, for instance venture capitalists, may have a well diversified portfolio of investments.
Thus, one may justify the assumption of risk neutrality. The entrepreneur usually is not able to
diversify, however, they may not be risk averse in general, since often they quit a quite safe job in
order to start their own business, see Black/Gilson (1998). The qualitative results do not change
significantly assuming risk aversion.
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If the investor demands a lower share than in (3.1), the entrepreneur will exert high
effort. In what follows we assume that this holds:
(4) 
X ) p (
I
L p +






Thus, we focus on the case where it pays for the entrepreneur to exert high effort
when there is no moral hazard by the investor. To sum up, the sequence of the game
may be described as follows:
1
st  period: An entrepreneur E needs funds for her venture consisting of a project
in the first and a project in the second stage.
An investor O offers a financial contract for the investment I in the
first stage. Since the investment volume is fixed, the offer refers to the
required share s1. There is tough competition among venture
capitalists such that O only earns a zero profit.
The entrepreneur chooses the level of specific investments.
The project of the first stage is undertaken.
2
nd  period: After financing the first period, the (old) investor O has got known the
entrepreneur’s idea. O can appropriate some rents since the property
rights on the idea are not entirely protected.
O makes an offer to finance the project in the second stage.
Entrepreneur E can refuse and terminate the relationship with O.
Instead, a new investor N could finance the project. Again, the




The entrepreneur accepts the more favorable offer.
The entrepreneur chooses the level of specific investments.
The project of the second stage is undertaken.
3
rd  period: In case of success, the outcome of the investment in t=0 is X, in case
of failure, it is 0.
4
th  period: In case of success, the outcome of the investment in t=1 is X, in case
of failure, it is 0.







E  chooses 


















depends on  e
2 3
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2.2  Analysis
First-best:
The first-best-solution can be derived very easily. Since the investor does not
appropriate rents in the second stage although property rights are not entirely
protected, in equilibrium, O demands a share
(3.2) s = 




and - due to the assumption in (4) - the entrepreneur chooses a high effort level.
This holds for the second stage as well as for the first stage. Thus, social surplus
amounts to:
(5) YE + YO = YE = 2(pLX - I + pX - eH).
Because of tough competition, the investor receives a zero return.
Moral Hazard by the (old) investor:
We now assume that the old investor who financed the first stage may take
advantage of the weak intellectual property rights. Because of backward induction
we start with period 2. With weak intellectual property rights, the old investor may
credibly threaten to appropriate rents if the entrepreneur switches to another new
investor. How much he can extract from this threat depends on the entrepreneur’s
outside option, i.e. on the terms a new investor would offer. A new investor N takes
into account that cooperative surplus may be reduced by the amount w￿(pX-I)
according to assumption (M3). Thus, in order to finance the second stage, N
demands at least (that means even in the case the entrepreneur exerts high effort):
13
(6)  [ ] I X ) e ( p X ) e ( p
I
sN
2 - w -
= .
Obviously, the entrepreneur will only exert high effort if  N
2 s  does not exceed the
critical value s* according to (3.1), that is if holds:
(7)
) I X p ( X p
I
H H - w -




  or rearranging:
                                                       
13 The entrepreneur exerts high effort, if the share demanded by N does not exceed s* in (3.1).
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w £ w* = 










Thus, if the old investor would be able to expropriate a larger portion than w* from
the project’s net value, an entrepreneur will not choose the efficient effort level.
These are the two cases now: first the share demanded by N exceeds s* in (3.1) (i.e.,
w > w*), second it does not. In the latter case the entrepreneur will exert high effort,
in the first case she will not.
Let us have a closer look to the more interesting first case. Thus, N demands a share
of:
(6.1) 





2 - w -
= .
The entrepreneur prefers to stick with the old investor if (8) holds:




2 - w - - ‡ -   or, by rearranging:
X p











Thus, the old investor may even ask for a higher share than the new investor since
with the new investor the cooperative surplus is lower. Since the old investor may
benefit from a high effort level, he will not demand  O
2 s  in any case. Rather, he
compares his individual surplus for the opportunistic bid s2 =  O
2 s  with the surplus for
the lower bid s2 = s* which is incentive compatible. The old investor tends to
demand  O
2 s  if (9) holds:
(9) - I +  X p s L
O
2  ‡ - I +  X p * s H   or:
O
2 s ‡ s*(pH/pL).
Thus, other things being equal, the old investor’s incentive to demand a higher share
in stage 2 is the stronger,
• the lower the proportion pH/pL is, i.e., the larger the benefit from high effort is (p
= pH -  pL),
• the more the old investor can appropriate rents from the invention (w), i.e. the
less the innovation’s property rights are protected,
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• the larger the share  N
2 s the new investor demands for financing the second stage.
This share increases as w increases, i.e, the more rents the old investor is able to
expropriate.















The opportunity to “steal” the innovator’s idea strengthen the old investor’s
opportunistic incentive in two ways. First, the threat of “stealing the idea” improves
the old investor’s negotiation power directly. Second, there is an indirect effect:
because the cooperative surplus is shrinking, a new investor will demand terms
which are less favorable to the innovator. It is even possible that the new investor is
not willing to finance the second stage at all. In this case the old investor is even able
to appropriate the entire cooperative surplus in the second stage.
How does this affect the level of specific investments by the entrepreneur ? If the old
investor asks for a higher share in the second stage the entrepreneur is more likely to
underinvest. We were investigating the first case, where the share demanded by the
new investor N exceeds s* in (3.1). In this case, E underinvests for sure, since O
demands an even higher share according to (8). In the second case, underinvestment
may not necessarily occur, however, it becomes more likely, the less the innovation’s
property rights are protected. Compared with the first-best-situation, there may be a
social loss in the second stage due to weak property rights - despite of the
assumption that the investors earn zero profit.
The investor’s profits in the second stage influence the terms in the first stage. Since
an investor who accompanied the venture in the first stage may receive a positive
return in the second one all investors are willing to accept losses in the first stage
when there is perfect competition among venture capitalists. Thus, financial terms
are even more favorable to the entrepreneur in the first stage than in the first best
solution. Therefore, there is no underinvestment in the first stage with tough
competition among venture capitalists.
Without tough competition, the entrepreneur’s surplus tends to increase as the
investor’s portion on the cooperative surplus in the first stage increases, i.e. the lower
the degree of competition among venture capitalists is. If the degree of competition is
sufficiently low, the entrepreneur’s gains in the first stage may not cover her loss in
the second stage and thus, she may abstain from the venture capital market even
10 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 15
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though the venture is valuable. Therefore, the model may explain why there is only a
little financing by venture capitalists in the very first stages of ventures.
14 Some also
argue that the venture capital market does not work very well in these stages since
the quality of the entrepreneur and/or the venture is hardly assessable and
entrepreneurs have much discretion to behave opportunistically.
15
Are the results still robust in the case of debt or hybrid financing ? The old, inside
investor’s incentive to negotiate better terms in the second period is due to the lack of
intellectual property rights protection but not to the type of financing. Thus, debt
financing or mixed financing would not significantly change the qualitative results of
the analysis. There is, however, an important difference between equity and debt
financing. Form a legal point of view, there is an upper bound on the interest rate
creditors can demand thereby limiting the extent to which an inside investor could
hold up an entrepreneur.  According to the jurisdiction to § 138 of the German civil
code (“usurious interest”) interest rates exceeding a certain threshold are supposed to
violate the law.
16 At first glance, this provision may be considered to be inefficient
since it restricts bargaining and the set of possible negotiation outcomes. In our
model, however, it limits the investor’s discretion to behave opportunistically and
thus, may induce the entrepreneur to invest efficiently. Note that there are similar
legal provisions in other jurisdictions, too, e.g. in many US-states.
17
3.  The role of patent law
The existence and the basic principles underlying patent law can be mainly derived
from the trade-off
18 between setting incentives to innovate by giving exclusive
property rights on the invention and restricting the monopoly power due to a patent.
19
There are additional costs and benefits to patent law. Let us have a look at the costs
neglecting administrative costs.
20 Usually, the entrepreneur who first files for a
                                                       
14 Empirical evidence is given by EVCA (2002) and NVCA (2001).
15 See Amit/Glosten/Muller (1990).
16 See Palandt (1999), pp. 120-122. A contractual interest rate which is either more than double the
„market rate“ or  exceeds the market rate by 12 percentage points at least is supposed to be immoral
und thus illegal.
17 See Stehle (1984).
18 See Besen/Raskind (1991), p. 5, Cooter/Ulen (1997), pp. 119f, 123f.
19 The extent of monopoly power also depends on additional factors, for instance whether there is
competition between different technologies (see Kitch (1998), p. 14) or whether there are network
effects which may stabilise monopoly power (see Farrell (1995)).
20 Dam (1994), pp. 286-292, presents possible costs of patent law and how the U.S. jurisdiction, in
particular, addresses them.
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patent receives it.
21  This may induce inefficient patent races, i.e. several
entrepreneurs working on the same invention may overinvest in effort, time and
money, but only one obtains the "price".
22 Additionally, too strong patent protection
may hamper future research based on former patents. When an entrepreneur receives
a too large portion of the returns on future investment, research may not be
undertaken.
23
Of course, there are benefits to patent law besides providing incentives to innovate.
Since a disclosure of the invention is generally
24 required,  it is possible that other
firms can use this new information for their own purposes, save costs in production
or open up revenue sources by developing a new product based on the invention.
Since only the first entrepreneur obtains the patent there is an incentive to invent
quickly. Thus, a new technology is likely to be transmitted quite quickly and at low
costs.
25 If there was no patent law the entrepreneur generally would have had an
incentive to keep the innovation secret.
Because of this trade-off between different kinds of benefits and different kinds of
costs patents are restricted with respect to duration
26 and scope. Moreover, the
invention has to meet certain requirements before the entrepreneur receives patent
protection.
This article shows, that there may be an additional benefit to patent law, which - to
my knowledge - have not been explicitly mentioned yet in the literature. The more
inventions are covered by patent protection and the earlier they are covered the
weaker is the investor's incentive to appropriate rents by renegotiating the contract.
On the other hand, the more likely the entrepreneur chooses the efficient level of
specific investments. This makes it easier to finance and develop inventions.
In the European Union and in Germany, the entrepreneur's property rights will only
be protected, if the patent authority (European Patent Agency in Munich) grants a
patent. Otherwise there is no protection of property rights except on a contractual
                                                       
21 In the U.S., the one who files first obtains the patent, see Besen/ Raskind (1991), p. 7.
22 See  Besen/Raskind (1991), p. 6 and Scotchmer (1998), p. 275.
23 See Alpen (2000).
24 Except inventions where the state has an interest not to disclose, for instance inventions for military
purposes.
25 See Kitch (1998), S. 15.
26 From an economic point of view the patent should be granted until the marginal social costs of the
patent (due to monopoly power) equal the marginal social benefits (incentive to innovate), see
Cooter/Ulen (1997), pp. 123f. Of course, the optimal patent duration should depend on the specific
invention. However, most patent laws grant a fixed period, mostly 20 years, for the U.S. see Barrett
(1999), p. 21, for Germany see § 16 I 1 PatG (German patent code).
12 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2002,  Paper 15
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basis. Apparently, this is different in the U.S. where the jurisdiction grants some
protection even for so-called undeveloped ideas.
27
In what follows we focus on the German patent law and have a closer look on the
requirements. In case that not all requirements are met the investor may be able to
steal the idea. Of course, this is also possible if the entrepreneur do not (correctly)
file for patent protection although the invention would meet the requirements. The
requirements are (see §§ 1-5 PatG (German patent code) and Art. 52-57 EPA
(European Patent Agreement)): the invention should be (a) technical, (b) sufficiently
developed, (c) novel and (d) non-obvious for an expert. As we will show now, some
inventions may not meet these requirements and thus, the property rights are not
protected by patent law.
An invention is technical when a specific problem can be resolved by using nature
forces. The German patent code (§ 1 II PatG, see also Art. 52 II EPA) denies
explicitly the technical character for discoveries, scientific theories, non-technical
instructions, games, doing business and computer programs. Let us have a look at
two important fields of research: gene technology and information technology.
Inventions with respect to gene technology are considered to be technical.
28
Inventions in the field of information and communication technology are technical
when they are not computer programs,
29 but when they can be described by a
program. This definition is not clear-cut. To give an impression: an anti-block-
system for car brakes
30 and a X-ray-apparatus both controlled by a computer were
considered as being technical.
31 A patent for a computer-management-system was
granted, too,
32 however, not for a program on the exchange of securities, not for a
spelling program either.
33 In some cases it may not be clear whether an invention is
technical or not,
34  thus protection of property rights is uncertain and may hamper the
entrepreneur to ask an investor for funds. Note, however, that a computer program
may be protected under copy right code.
                                                       
27 See Barrett (1999), pp. 83-86. Basic requirements are „novelty“ and „concreteness“, i.e. the idea
should be sufficiently developed. These criteria are applied differently in different U.S. states.
28 See Schulte (1994), p. 65.
29 See Bernhardt/Krasser  (1986), p. 94 and Schulte (1994), p. 26.
30 See Bernhardt/Krasser (1986), p. 94, decision by the German supreme court.
31 See Singer/Stauder (2000), p. 108, decision by the European Patent Agency.
32 See Singer/Stauder (2000), p. 109.
33 See Bruchhausen et al. (1993), p. 208,
34 See Ilzhöfer (2000), p. 33. With respect to computer programs both jurisdiction and patent
authorities tend to grant patents more and more in not clear-cut cases, see Singer/Stauder (2000), p.
109.
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Moreover, the invention must be sufficiently developed, i.e. an expert should be able
to successfully carry out the invention using the description in the documents the
entrepreneur has to provide for filing.
35 The basic reasoning behind the result of the
invention should be made clear. Smaller shortcomings are tolerated, however, the
invention have been sufficiently tested already.
36
The invention must be new and sufficiently beyond the state of the art (see § 3 I 1 1
and § 4 I PatG; Art. 54 I and Art. 56 I EPA. The state of the art is defined by the
publicly available knowledge at the date of filing. It does not matter where, how and
when the knowledge was disclosed.
37 Of course, other patents are part of this
knowledge. An entrepreneur will not receive patent protection when the invention
already exists abroad. Part of this knowledge is also the information the entrepreneur
already provided, e.g. on fairs. Thus, she should file for a patent before.
Finally, the invention should be non-obvious to an expert of average proficiency and
average knowledge. Some inventions which are beyond the state of the art but not
sufficiently, are excluded from patent protection.
38 Of course it is hard to measure
and judge whether an invention is obvious or not to an expert. Thus, it is not
surprising that the decisions of courts and patent authorities on this criterion are
sometimes considered to be hardly predictable.
39 Thus, the entrepreneur may wait
with the filing until the innovation is sufficiently developed. Then it is more likely
that it is considered to be non-obvious. However, when the entrepreneur waits she
may be afraid of that somebody steals the idea.
To sum up, property rights are only protected when the invention meets the
requirements of patent law. At the date of filing the entrepreneur obtains some
preliminary property rights. After the patent authority has entirely checked the
requirements the patent can be granted. The period between filing date and granting
date may take several months or even years. In the meanwhile, the entrepreneur
cannot exclude others from using the invention, however she can demand appropriate
compensation. After the patent is granted the property rights are stronger, she can
exclude others from using the invention. Note, however, that there is no protection of
property rights before filing, at least in Germany and in the European Union. This
may be different in the U.S. Thus, other things being equal, entrepreneurs may
                                                       
35 See Bernhardt/Krasser (1986), p. 109, Bruchhausen et al. (1993), p. 164.
36 See Bruchhausen et al. (1993), p. 165.
37 See Bernhardt/Krasser (1986), p. 140.
38 This is the impression of Bernhardt/Krasser (1986), p. 163.
39 See Bernhardt/Krasser (1986), S. 167.
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contact investors earlier since the threat of renegotiation is less severe. In order to
evaluate the process of patent granting and its impact of venture financing it is not
sufficient to look at the law, but also how the legal provisions are interpreted by
patent authorities in different countries.
4.  Conclusion
Possibly, the staging of capital is the most salient feature of venture financing. This
feature, however, may induce opportunistic behavior by the investor. After the first
stage, he may ask for a higher share on future cash flows threatening not to continue
the venture.  The entrepreneur may be forced to accept the investor’s offer, when she
is supposed to lose something by switching to another (new) investor. For instance, if
the property rights on the invention are not protected - because the entrepreneur has
not filed for a patent or the invention does not meet the legal requirements for patent
protection - the investor may use the idea for his own purposes once the
entrepreneur terminates the relationship. This threat may force the entrepreneur to
continue although the investor demands a higher share. As a consequence, she sticks
with the (old) investor, however, she may not choose the efficient level of specific
investments, rather she underinvests. 
The impact of patent law is important. In the law and economics literature patent law
is primarily seen as an instrument balancing the trade-off between setting incentives
to innovate and limiting monopoly power of patent holders. It, however, overlooks
the fact that an entrepreneur’s idea often only develops to a market product with the
help of investors providing financial resources. Thus, I argue that there is an
additional goal of patent law: mitigating conflicts in the venture financing process
thereby making innovations more likely.
Appendix: List of Symbols
E entrepreneur’s name
e level of entrepreneur’s specific investment: high and low level: eH>0,
eL= 0
I (fixed) investment volume
N name of a new investor who has not financed the first stage
O name of the old investor who already financed the first stage
p (success) probability for a high return X; 1-p is the failure probability
(zero return)
pL (pH) success probability with low (high) level of specific investment
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s investor’s share on future returns
) s ( , s O
2
N
2 share of the new (old) investor on the future returns on the second
investment in t=1
s*  critical share level: if an investor requires more than s*, the
entrepreneur chooses a low inefficient level of specific investments
X return of an investment in case of success
YE, YO, YN expected utility of entrepreneur A, investor O, investor N
p additional success probability with a high level of specific investments
component (p = pH - pL).
w portion of the innovation’s net value which the old investor would
expropriate if the entrepreneur chooses a new investor and if the
property rights on the invention are not sufficiently protected; 0£ w <1
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